Can the U.S. Leave Behind “Afghan-Sustainable” Military Bases?

As one outpost is prepared for a handover, a report raises the risks attendant upon the departure of American forces

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John Wendle for TIME

U.S. soldiers from Bravo Battery, 4-319, 173 Airborne Brigade, toss wood from a torn down Afghan restaurant on Combat Outpost Garda into a dump truck in preparation for a handover of the COP to Afghan forces on September 14, 2012.

The arm of the battered orange backhoe rose up and came crashing down on the plastic-and-steel walls and roof of the barracks. The corrugated roofing squealed and popped off. A plastic wall buckled and fell flat, raising a thick cloud of dust. Bright yellow insulation spooled out and tangled everywhere.Then the arm swung over and scooped up a bucket of dirt from a smashed Hesco barrier and buried the debris.

American troops have abandoned “downtown” as they called this part of Combat Outpost Garda, in Wardak Province, and moved up to the top of their fortified hill in the lead-up to leaving the base in the coming weeks. It is part of making the outpost “Afghan-sustainable” as it is handed over to the company of Afghan National Army (ANA) soldiers stationed here. But there is already considerable doubt, despite downsizing facilities to make them more manageable, that thefledgling Afghan security forces can sustain the necessary operations and patrols  to keep the country stable as more such combat outposts (COPs) are handed over to Afghanistan amid the U.S. and NATO drawdown ahead of the planned 2014 pullout.

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“We have a tolai here, an Afghan company,” says  Col. Andrew Rohling of the 173rd Airborne Brigade and head of operations in Logar and Wardak Provinces, as he surveyed Garda with a handover team and an Afghan counterpart. “So our goal is to take [the base] down from what is an American size company to an Afghan size company. The size is about the same, but it’s the logistics. Its all about,really, its all about logistics. The Afghan tolai just doesn’t have the same logistical capacity as the American company.”

When the U.S. troops pull out of Garda, it and the surrounding high mountain valley will become the domain of the Afghan company– and the entrenched insurgent groups that surround it. For many of the Afghan soldiers, it is strange to see infrastructure that has been trucked in at enormous cost and built on territory gained with great difficulty knocked down with such little fanfare. As more of the walls came crashing down, an Afghan translator watching from nearby told TIME, “Every time the ANA goes off the base, they are attacked by roadside bombs, sometimes [insurgents] ambush them. I think if [Coalition forces] leave Afghanistan, the Taliban will start fighting everywhere,” he says, speaking anonymously because he did not feel comfortable talking on such a small installation. “It will be like it was – when there was civil war everywhere. There will be more fighting,” says the translator, who has lived on the base for around two years.

A report by an American military Human Terrain Team that was shown to TIME by a U.S. officer outlines the specific fears the U.S. military has about the upcoming handover of Garda. The study draws lessons from the results of thehandover late last year of Jalrez, a combat outpost just a few miles from Garda lying along the strategic east-west Route 2 that crosses the mountainous midsection of the country.

Taking lessons from the closure of the nearby base, the report, in part, reads that, “The closure of COP Garda will have minimal impact on the security of the predominantly Pashtun population residing east of the Jalrez District Center (DC); however, the Hazara/Tajik communities residing west of the DC will suffer due to an influx of Taliban fighters, and the resurgence of historical rivalries with their Pashtun neighbors.” Also, because there is only one road through the valley, Hazara and Tajik farmers will effectively be cut off byillegal checkpoints from markets in their provincial capital and in Kabul, just 30 miles away.

(PHOTOS: Afghanistan Now, Photographs by Yuri Kozyrev)

More alarmingly, the report says that, “Historically, Jalrez District has served as a critical avenue to facilitate attacks upon Maidan Shahr and Kabul.” With the closure of COP Garda, not only will ethnic tensions and violence increase in northern Wardak, but a critical blocking position will be removed, making it that much easier for Taliban, Hisb-e-Islami and other insurgent factions, such as the Haqqani Network, to infiltrate Kabul and conduct attacks.

A NATO official tells TIME that the Coalition has closed and handed over around 320 bases with half given to the ANA and half to other government security agencies. The official says no bases have been closed outright. The territory and bases have been relinquished through a series of tranches – with the most peaceful areas – provinces and cities like Bamyan, Mazar-e-Sharif, Herat and Panjsher – handed over first. Col. Rohling is realistic about the Afghans’ ability to manage it all. Says he, “I don’t have a problem giving it to them – the problem is that they can’t manage it. They don’t have the fuel to run it, the power, all the things that go with it. The reality is, they’re not jacked up, it’s just that they don’t have the American logistical system.”

As the U.S. and NATO have tried to disentangle themselves from the country, they have pushed for speedier handovers. “The question is: how fast do you hand over? It’s not a gulf of difference. It is a spectrum and it depends on your judgment on the progress we are making. And on the security side we are making good progress,” said Sir Richard Stagg, British ambassador in Kabul, in an interview with the Guardian on Tuesday. “The more the people of Afghanistan see their own government stand on its own two feet, the better for everybody. This is not a matter of us cutting and running and disappearing, it is a matter of shifting the nature of our engagement from hand-holding to one which is offering support as needed andrequired.”

But most Afghans do not see it that way. “This round will be different from the others because insecure areas are part of this round of transition,” Afghan Defense Minister Bismillah Mohammadi said Tuesday at a press conference, adding that while he welcomed the withdrawal of NATO troops, he was concerned about the upcoming fourth and fifth tranches. He added that, “The Afghanistan situation is very sensitive right now.”

PHOTOS: A Long and Distant War: Photos from Afghanistan, 1988-2009

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According to my son, who is currently serving in Afghanistan, the first base we turned over to the Afghan army has been stripped down and everything has been sold by the Taliban, including the copper in the wiring.  Now the members of the Afghan army assigned to that base are all living in a few barracks with no electricity.  I'm glad to see we are starting off by stripping the bases ourselves so that there will be much less to sell and perhaps the Afghan army will actually have a base to operate from!


Another important article, John. The critical part of the handovers in Wardak and Logar is supply/logisitics. They're "confident" about the security portion, but not about the logistical portion. Without the logistics in place, there will be no security portion in a matter of months, maybe even weeks. You can't expect the ANA to sit at a small outpost with no fuel, clean water (which I'm sure we're still providing via contract), and heat for their buildings with winter approaching. And we certainly can't trust the Afghan government to procure and deliver the necessary supplies. 

I think there is a huge lesson to be learned here for the US. If we fully eliminate government infrastructure, we need to make sure to put another FULL structure in place. We can't just teach fighters to maintain security, especially in a culture where education is not prevalent. So, now we're leaving Afghanistan after providing them with even more uneducated fighters, but no solid infrastructure. At the National Police Training Center (NPTC) in Wardak, the NATO forces tried to teach the ANP (Afghan National Police) how to procure things through their own government system. The ANP attempted to build some guard towers in the area around the NPTC, and had to actually get money from their government then get a contractor to complete the work. The project went on for a couple of years but wasn't completed or even being worked on when I visited. An Afghan contractor through the US military could have the project completed in 60 days or less. This location was the only location where I saw coalition forces working with Afghans on the logistics piece. And by the way, it was just 2 fantastic, motivated, and educated US military members who were initiating this training for the Afghans. Those two really inspired me and others who saw the work they were doing.

I'm not going to hold my breath with these handovers, especially in Wardak/Logar. Even with the strong US presence in the region, a small outpost was handed over, overrun, and abandoned  in 2 days. I don't want to even think about the financial portion of this, knowing how much money is spent to set up and maintain an outpost. The US Commanders are "fighters" and not logistics guys, and they don't see the importance of creating the logistics infrastructure... one of them actually said "it's not important" to me during my time over there. I'm afraid Afghanistan is about to prove him wrong.

Michael Wellman
Michael Wellman

We've put in place a number of FabLabs in Afghanistan that should allow them to reproduce the materials they need to sustain their bases.  Only time will tell if the Afghans have the nerve to stand together and fight, or if they'll allow themselves to be bought out by the Warlords that seek to press the people of Afghanistan back into tribal servitude.

T Marq
T Marq

Sand is sand, rock is rock, and wood is wood and all will eventually crumble back to the earth. The only thing that the Afghanistan has that we want is OUT. Case close. 


What are we leaving in Afghanistan?  Our treasure, our most vvalued treasure, our men and women who were sent to Afghanistan to promote democracy, to give them the opportunity to have a democratic nation, to, essentially, come out of the dark ages.  So, we've left gallons of blood on the ground of Afghanistan; munitions, ammo, direct one on one teaching and education in how to defend their own country. Yet we were going up against centuries of "tribal alliances," rooted in oral histories, centuries old traditions, and little to no concept of what the modern world has brought to them.

So, the cycle of trying to "westernize" Afghanistan, once again fails, not only in epic numbers of what it cost the ISAF personnel in sheer logistics, but more importantly, what it cost in ISAF personnel who were killed, some by Taliban or Al Qaida, but too, too often by their alleged "allies."  The United States military has known "allies" in the past; our War of Independance from England; the French; our Allies in WWI, the French and the British; our Allies in WWII, the British and the French, the Canadians.  In this war we have no Middle Easteran allies; we have only those who are allegedly our allies, until they turn their AK-47's on our troops to kill them.  It's now starting 12 years, and if we were in Afghanistan for the next 100 years, I do not it would make one whit of difference. Centuries of fluid tribal affilitations will NOT overcome a mere 11 years of trying to "Democratize" the Afghan people.

One thing we forgot to ask the Afghan people before this cluster started?  "Do you want to be "Democratized?"  Maybe that was the real question behind this abysmal current status, that should have been asked BEFORE we started?  Just one USAR retiree's thoughts.

Michael Wellman
Michael Wellman

The question at hand isn't whether the Afghan people do or do not want to.  That's not why they go back to tribal alliances.  It's whether or not the guys with the guns want them to.  They go back to the tribal alliances to survive, since they lack the means to defend themselves, and since their military is so easily bought out by warlords promising a better, more lucrative future if they assist those warlords in subjugating the masses.